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LEGITIMACY & LITIGATION: 
THE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE 
COLLEEN M. FLOOD*  
Much ink has been spilt by scholars over how courts should adjudicate 
socio-economic rights, frequently by scholars in countries that do not 
expressly include such rights in their constitution. Pedro Felipe de Oliveira 
Santos describes well the formalist approach that drives many jurists and 
scholars to argue for minimalism on the part of courts adjudicating socio-
economic rights.1 The separation of power(s) argument is that courts are 
not democratically elected–governments are–and so the latter should be 
responsible for the complex trade-offs involved in allocating public funds 
to social programs. 
When I present on litigation of health rights and discuss the volume of 
cases in countries like Brazil (just shy of 393,000 cases in 2014)2 or 
Colombia (113,000 claims in 2012)3, the usual reaction from legal scholars 
in high income countries is one of shock and disapprobation: this is not 
how courts should act. And if courts are to adjudicate socio-economic 
rights, even progressive scholars seem far more comfortable with the 
South African jurisprudence where the volume of successful health rights 
cases is very small. And contentment with this conservative approach 
persists despite the fact of massive inequalities in access to health care in 
South Africa, which have only grown larger since the end of apartheid.4 
In Canada, where section 7 of the Canadian Charter5 guarantees the 
right to life, liberty and security of the person, the courts have, so far, 
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1  Pedro Felipe de Oliveira Santos, Beyond Minimalism and Usurpation: Designing Judicial 
Review to Control the Mis-Enforcement of Socio-economic Rights, 18 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. 
REV. 493 (2019). 
2  CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, RELATÓRIOS DE CUMPRIMENTO DA RESOLUÇÃO CNJ N. 
107 (National Forum of Health-related Litigation Report), 
http://www.cnj.jus.br/images/programas/forumdasaude/demandasnostribunais.forumSaude.pdf (cited 
in Santos, supra note 1, at 499 n.22).  
3  Everaldo Lamprea, Colombia’s Right-to-Health Litigation in a Context of Health Care 
Reform, in THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AT THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: A GLOBAL COMPARATIVE STUDY 
131, 145 (Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross eds., 2014). 
4  Lisa Forman, The Role of Rights and Litigation in Assuring More Equitable Access to Health 
Care in South Africa, in THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AT THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: A GLOBAL 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 288 (Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross eds., 2014). 
5  Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
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largely dismissed claims for public funding of health care.6 Canadian 
courts have been willing to use section 7 to strike down legislation seen as 
unreasonably intrusive of personal liberties–for example, criminal laws 
limiting access to abortions,7 medical-aid-in-dying,8 and medical 
marijuana.9 However, courts have not been willing to employ section 7 to 
require governments to provide public coverage or to protect against cuts 
in public coverage, even in the case of claims by refugees cut off from 
coverage of essential life-saving health care.10 Even more insidiously,11 
Canadian courts have used the Charter to strike down a law limiting 
opportunities for privatization of health care on the grounds that wait times 
in the public system jeopardize security of the person (and possibly one’s 
life) and thus patients have a right to seek out care privately.12 These same 
wait times of course impact those without the means to pay for care 
privately or whom, because of age or disability, are excluded from private 
insurance plans; however, the court’s dismal interpretation of the 
Canadian Charter fails to protect their interests. Bolstered by the Chaoulli 
decision,13 litigation is presently underway to employ the Charter to strike 
down other laws protective of public medicare.14 The approach of the 
 
 
6 See e.g., Flora v. Ontario Health Insurance Plan, 2008 ONCA 538 (CanLII); Canadian 
Doctors for Refugee Care v. Canada (Attorney general), 2014 FC 651 (CanLII). The Canadian 
Supreme Court has intervened only in isolated cases. For example it was found that hospitals must 
provide sign language translation services so that the hearing-impaired can access care on equal terms. 
Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624. Note, however, that such cases 
concern ensuring equal access to the basket of established services – the courts are not being asked to 
add anything to the basket.   
7  R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30. 
8  Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 SCR 331. 
9  R. v. Parker, 2000 CanLII 5762 (ON CA). 
10  Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care v. Canada (Attorney general), 2014 FC 651 (CanLII). 
11  Sujit Choudhry, Worse than Lochner?, in ACCESS TO CARE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: THE LEGAL 
DEBATE OVER PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE IN CANADA, 75 (Colleen M. Flood, Kent Roach & Lorne 
Sossin eds., 2005).  
12  Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 SCR 791. The court justifies its stance on 
grounds that there is no obvious evidence from other jurisdictions that permitting privatization will 
undermine the public health care system, wholly failing to understand the unique history, structure and 
dynamics of the Canadian system. See Colleen M. Flood & Bryan Thomas, A Successful Charter 
Challenge to Medicare? Policy Options for Canadian Provincial Governments, 13 J. HEALTH ECON., 
POL’Y & L. 433 (2018). 
13  Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 SCR 791. 
14  Under Canadian federalism, health care falls largely under provincial jurisdiction, meaning 
that the Chaoulli ruling’s direct impact was limited to the province of Quebec. In ongoing litigation, a 
private for-profit surgical clinic, Cambie Surgeries Corporation, is seeking to build on the Chaoulli 
precedent and overturn laws protective of public medicare in the province of British Columbia. For 
statements and claims, expert affidavits, and other court filings to date, see Clinics Case Court 
Documents, BC HEALTH COALITION, https://www.bchealthcoalition.ca/what-you-can-do/save-
medicare/court-documents (last visited Mar. 3, 2019).   
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/7
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Canadian courts reflects a longstanding liberal conception of rights. In 
classical liberalism, rights are articulated as restrictions on the state’s 
power that, in Locke’s articulation, prohibit it from denying a citizen’s 
life, liberty, or property.15 In this tradition, rights mostly confer a negative 
duty on the state not to act, and are not only devoid of any distributional 
potential, but, to the contrary, may also entrench and exacerbate existing 
inequalities within society.  
But, as I have hinted at, and as Pedro Felipe de Oliveira Santos argues 
in Beyond Minimalism and Usurpation,16 perhaps the global stance of 
legal scholars towards a U.S. style of minimal review for socio-economic 
rights does not have diamond-hard legitimacy. Indeed, let us start with the 
simple proposition that whilst the doctrine of separation of powers has 
great constitutional import, so too must the fact that, in a country like 
Brazil, socio-economic rights are explicitly enshrined in the constitution.17 
A blinkered worldview overlooks the fact that approximately 70% of 
constitutions worldwide now contain health-related guarantees, while the 
right to health is justiciable in approximately 40%.18 Developed-world 
scholars work within a belief system that socio-economic rights lack 
legitimacy and that even countries desirous of greater socio-economic 
rights move in small, incremental steps; but where such rights are 
explicitly part of a country’s constitution, arguments grounded in 
parliamentary supremacy and separation of powers lose much of their 
force. Countries that have justiciable socio-economic rights have 
undertaken constitutional reform often in the wake of massive political 
upheaval–post communism, post-dictatorship, post- apartheid.19 Socio-
economic rights such as health rights have been made part of the 
constitutions of a number of middle-income countries following major 
political upheavals and are justiciable precisely in order to accelerate an 
 
 
15  See generally JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (1690). For a discussion of 
this understanding of rights, see Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal Gross, Introduction: Do We Need Social 
Rights? Questions in the Era of Globalisation, Privatisation, and the Diminished Welfare State, in 
EXPLORING SOCIAL RIGHTS: BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE 1 (Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal Gross 
eds., 2007). 
16  Santos, supra note 1. 
17  CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 196 (Braz.) (“Health is the right of all 
and the duty of the National Government and shall be guaranteed by social and economic policies 
aimed at reducing the risk of illness and other maladies and by universal and equal access to all 
activities and services for its promotion, protection and recovery.”). 
18  Courtney Jung, Ran Hirschl & Evan Rosevear, Economic and Social Rights in National 
Constitutions, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 1043 (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2349680. 
19  Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross, Conclusion: Contexts for the Promise and Peril of the 
Right to Health, in THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AT THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: A GLOBAL 
COMPARATIVE STUDY (Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross eds., 2014). 
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equality agenda faster than is possible in capitalist democracies relying on 
trickle-down economics. 
And perhaps there is a reasonably straightforward way to think about 
this: if a constitution explicitly provides for socio-economic rights, then 
their legitimacy as a class of rights is ipso facto established. Consequently, 
although there has been a globalization of U.S. ideas in so many domains, 
including in legal reasoning, this claim that socio-economic rights lack 
legitimacy should have little impact on legal reasoning in countries where 
socio-economic rights are clearly part of the constitution and where courts 
have clearly been given the power to adjudicate. As de Oliveira Santos 
claims, “[t]he question is not whether courts may intervene, but how courts 
may intervene according to constitutional parameters.”20 
However, recognizing the legitimacy of judicial enforcement of health 
rights is by itself not sufficient. A worry for those aspiring for health rights 
as a force for positive change is that rights will not be used to improve and 
save the lives of the most vulnerable, but instead will be co-opted by the 
middle-class and wealthy,21 or used by pharmaceutical companies and 
other industry interests to ensure that their products are prioritized over 
other, potentially more effective, investments in health or public health. 
The concern is that, instead of the right to health helping to sustain 
important values like equality, a focus on rights-based norms will further 
foster individualism and exacerbate inequalities, as  Pedro Felipe de 
Oliveira Santos demonstrates in his review of the Brazilian health rights 
jurisprudence. 
What becomes clear is that applying the traditional liberal structure of 
rights to socio-economic rights will not realize the goals motivating the 
inclusion of those rights within constitutions. A formalist perspective of 
the enforcement of rights–and a right-as-trumps perspective–operates 
largely without consideration of the impact on the public fisc. and thus, in 
health care, without consideration of the impact on the ability to sustain 
and fairly allocate health resources. Applying such formalism to the health 
care rights quickly results, as has been the case in jurisdictions like Brazil 
and Colombia, in significant challenges to the sustainability of public 
health care systems—jeopardizing not only public programs but also 
public faith in the courts.22 Moreover, if legal challenges are exclusively 
 
 
20  Santos, supra note 1 at 501.  
21  Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross, Introduction: Marrying Health and Human Rights and 
Health Care Systems, in THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AT THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: A GLOBAL 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 452 (Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross eds., 2014). 
22  Mariana Mota Prado, Provision of Health Care Services and the Right to Health in Brazil, in 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/7
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the purview of industry interests and wealthier individuals, this can, as de 
Oliveira Santos notes, distort the allocation of public resources away from 
those most in need.23 
Complicating the base problem of formalism is also a 
misunderstanding amongst many, including judges, about how medical 
need is defined and the economics of health care systems. Frequently 
judges assume that even if just one physician says a patient needs a certain 
drug or device or treatment, this must then equate with medical need and 
in turn a right to health care.24 In actuality, there are frequently many 
different treatment options and physicians frequently have zero incentive 
to consider the cost and relative benefits of different treatments. Thus, for 
example, as between two drugs of similar effectiveness, the doctor has no 
incentive to prescribe the drug that costs $1.00 as opposed to the drug that 
costs $200.00.  If judgments are issued equating a physician treatment 
recommendation with what is required under the right to health care, this 
also emasculates the ability of public insurers to negotiate a more 
reasonable price for that drug, device or treatment. Once a right, then the 
public plan must pay whatever price the manufacturer or service provider 
demands. Indeed, we have seen examples of industry interests backing 
health right claims as a way to have their products publicly-funded at the 
price they demand rather than what would otherwise be negotiated by the 
public insurer.25  
This naivety on the part of many judges regarding how health care 
markets work may, in the minds of some, substantiate the concern that 
they are out of their depths when adjudicating socio-economic rights, and 
that these complex policy questions should be left to governments and the 
policymaking apparatus. However, accepting this largely gives up on the 
idea of health rights as a means to accelerate better distribution of 
resources within a society.26 Moreover, as mentioned earlier, courts in 
many countries arguably must improve their approach as ignoring health 
right claims is not an option. The only viable path is to get better at how 
 
 
THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AT THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: A GLOBAL COMPARATIVE STUDY 131, 145 
(Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross eds., 2014); Lamprea, supra note 3; Santos, supra note 1.  
23  Santos, supra note 1.  
24  Lamprea, supra note 3, at 144. 
25  Lamprea, supra note 3, at 150. 
26  Kent Roach has argued that the courts can play a positive role in adjudicating socio-
economic rights, without overreaching their institutional competency, through the use of creative 
remedies such as suspended declarations of invalidity, which hand the baton back to lawmakers to 
devise solutions to rights infringements within a set period of time. See Kent Roach, Polycentricity and 
Queue Jumping in Public Law Remedies: A Two-Track Response, 66 UNIV. OF TORONTO L.J. 3 
(2016). The use of creative remedies is part of the ‘how’ discussed below.  
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they adjudicate health rights and other socio-economic rights.27 
De Oliveira Santos’ arguments for how courts can do better in 
adjudication of health rights and other socio-economic rights builds on 
what others have argued in the past. He argues first that, in socio-
economic rights litigation, courts should be attendant to the impact on the 
distributive and aggregative effects of their decisions.28 In essence this is a 
call to take account of the economics of health care systems and to be alert 
to the realities that health rights litigation may not be driven by those most 
in need but from those with the resources and interests to litigate.  Being 
attendant to these issues would suggest, as I have argued with Aeyal 
Gross, that courts should in general be deferential to decisions by public 
insurers regarding what services attract public funding but cast a much 
more searching eye over decisions by public insurers to undercut a fair 
distribution of health care resources by, for example, privatizing parts of 
the health care system. 29  
Further de Oliveira Santos argues that courts should “[enrich] the 
democratic process, especially by pushing issues back to political players 
with correct incentives to act and institutional adherence wherever 
possible”30 This proposal echoes requirements that we see in 
administrative and constitutional law more generally for a fair process on 
the part of decision-makers, including participation by those most affected 
by a decision.31 It also reflects thinking by philosophers on how best to 
approach the minefield of determining what services are publicly funded, 
given the many variables that could be differently weighted by reasonable 
people.32 In the face of such heterogeneity of views regarding what should 
and should not be publicly insured, scholars such as Daniels and Sabin 
argue this is best determined by insisting upon a fair and accountable 
 
 
27  Santos, supra note 1. 
28  Santos, supra note 1, at 507.  
29  Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross, Conclusion: Contexts for the Promise and Peril of the 
Right to Health, in THE RIGHT TO HEALTH AT THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: A GLOBAL 
COMPARATIVE STUDY, 452 (Colleen M. Flood & Aeyal Gross eds., 2014). 
30  Santos, supra note 1, at 501. For a similar argument, see Martha Jackman, Protecting Rights 
and Promoting Democracy: Judicial Review Under Section 1 of the Charter, 34 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 
661. 
31  See generally Kate Glover, The Principles and Practices of Procedural Fairness, in 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN CONTEXT (Colleen M. Flood & Lorne Sossin eds., 3d. ed. 2018); Evan Fox-
Decent & Alexander Pless, The Charter and Administrative Law Part I: Procedural Fairness, in 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN CONTEXT (Colleen M. Flood & Lorne Sossin eds., 3d. ed. 2018).  
32  Norman Daniels & James Sabin, SETTING LIMITS FAIRLY: CAN WE LEARN TO SHARE 
MEDICAL RESOURCES (2002); Jens Byslov et al., The Need for Global Application of the 
Accountability for Reasonableness Approach to Support Sustainable Outcomes, 6 Int J Health Policy 
Manag 115 (2017).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/7
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process, without pretending that these questions can be settled 
categorically through more theorization about the right to health.33 
In conclusion, scholars in countries with a clear constitutional right to 
health and other socio-economic rights should not be paralyzed by views 
on the legitimacy of such rights by scholars and legal traditions in 
different constitutional contexts. Instead they should, as de Oliveira Santos 
argues, look purposively towards why socio-economic rights were 
included in their respective constitutions and seek to promote those 
democratic objectives through their judgments. In doing so, they should 
not force health rights into the formalist mold of traditional civil and 
political rights, for to do so will undermine the goal of ensuring a fairer 
distribution of resources and allocating health care on the basis of need 
and not ability to pay. The most important thing courts can do is to 
relentlessly insist on a fair and evidence-based decision-making process 
for determining what is and out of publicly funded the health care basket, 
including public participation and the right of appeal for individuals 
adversely affected.34 Courts can also stand as necessary to ensure that 
substantive decisions are rational and without undue discrimination in 
application, and, finally, to conduct a much more searching review of 
decisions that are antithetical to the goals behind inclusion of socio-
economic rights in the constitution, for example, policies permitting 
privatization or undercutting universality.35 
 
 
 
33  See e.g., Norman Daniels & James Sabin, Fair Procedures, Democratic Deliberation, and 
the Legitimacy Problem for Insurers, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 303 (1997).  
34  KEITH SYRETT, LAW, LEGITIMACY AND THE RATIONING OF HEALTH CARE (2007). 
35  For further elaboration, see Flood & Gross, Conclusion: Contexts for the Promise and Peril 
of the Right to Health, supra note 29. 
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